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 1 
CAN UNINCORPORATED TREATY OBLIGATIONS  
BE PART OF ENGLISH LAW? 
 
The orthodox point of departure 
The argument of this article is that there is reason to question the article of faith of 
English constitutional law according to which an international treaty obligation is 
not a part of English law unless it has been incorporated through an Act of 
Parliament.1 On the authority of this firmly held belief, the courts cannot consider 
as part of English law an obligation contained in an unincorporated treaty, since if 
they were able to do so the executive could, by way of treaty-making-as-
legislation, effectively abrogate the law of the land. By operation of this rule, 
continues the orthodoxy, it does not matter whether the unincorporated treaty 
obligation adds to or takes away from the rights of the subject. 
Under the new constitutional settlement emerging after 1688 the Crown 
lost many of the far-reaching powers that it had until then enjoyed. The Bill of 
Rights 1688 confirmed that “the pretended power of suspending of laws or the 
execution of laws by regall authority without consent of Parlyament is illegall” 
and that “the pretended power of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by 
regall authoritie as it hath beene assumed and exercised of late is illegall”.2 The 
rule that an unincorporated treaty obligation cannot override the common law is, 
we are told, based directly on the settlement of the Civil War and the Glorious 
Revolution.3 Thus, in Tin Council, a case concerning the question of whether a 
Minister was liable under English law for the debts of an international 
organization which had been established by a treaty to which the United Kingdom 
was a party, Lord Oliver observed against the backdrop of earlier cases that, 
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“[q]uite simply, a treaty is not part of English law unless and until it has been 
incorporated into the law by legislation.”4  
The judgment of the House of Lords in Tin Council has been considered 
the leading authority on unincorporated treaties and English law. It is routinely 
relied on by the courts, most recently by the Supreme Court in Miller, concerning 
the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU treaties. 5  In setting out the 
constitutional background against which the questions before the court fell to be 
settled, the Supreme Court in Miller observed that, although unincorporated 
treaties “are binding on the United Kingdom in international law, [they] are not 
part of UK law and give rise to no legal rights or obligations in domestic law”.6 
The Tin Council approach was also echoed by Lord Sumption in Belhaj. Although 
this case concerned the so-called foreign act of state doctrine and not the effect of 
treaties on English law, his Lordship observed, in relation to treaty based 
obligations, that:  
 
judges applying the common law are not at liberty to create, abrogate or 
modify municipal law rights or obligations in accordance with 
unincorporated norms derived from international law.7 
 
Although the cases just mentioned are weighty authorities of English 
constitutional law, in none of them was it strictly speaking necessary for the court 
to settle the question with which this article is concerned: are there situations in 
which the courts can rely directly on unincorporated treaty obligations?  
It is well-known that “the only part of a previous case which is binding is 
the ratio decidenci”.8 As Sir Frederick Pollock once observed, in a passage that 
received the imprimatur of Sir William Holdsworth9 and the House of Lords:10  
 
Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that 
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judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles 
accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision.11 
 
Furthermore, the Earl of Halsbury L.C. observed in Quinn v Leathem that “a case 
is only an authority for what it actually decides”.12 A question as important as 
whether there are circumstances in which unincorporated treaty obligations can be 
part of English law will not be decided by a side-wind. According to the tradition 
of the common law, it is a question that needs to be confronted foursquare before 
it can be taken to have been definitively settled. 
It is against that background, then, that the present article asks the heretical 
question, was Lord Oliver’s conclusion in Tin Council correct, and is it supported 
by the high authorities which it purports—and is generally assumed—to 
encapsulate? Is it, in other words, right to say that “[q]uite simply, a treaty is not 
part of English law unless and until it has been incorporated into the law by 
legislation”?13 
In order to come to grips with that question, it will be necessary to go back 
to the judgment that is by common acclamation the fons et origo of the law 
governing the relationship between English law and international treaties—the 
judgment in The Parlement Belge,14 where on the facts of the case the question of 
unincorporated treaties was squarely at issue before the court. The Parlement 
Belge is generally considered to be the authority from which the rule on English 
law and unincorporated treaties flow. 15  The case was decided by Sir Robert 
Phillimore, perhaps the most distinguished authority on international law in the 
English judiciary of his day.16 In addition to what the judgment said about treaties, 
it also developed certain aspects of the law of state immunity; these latter aspects 
                                                             
11 F. Pollock, “Introduction” in J. Drake and others (eds.), The Progress of Continental Law in the 
Nineteenth Century (Little, Brown & Co. 1918) xliv. 
12 Quinn v Leathem [1901] A.C. 495, 506. 
13 J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 A.C. 418, 500. 
14 The Parlement Belge (1879) 4 P.D. 129. 
15 This seems to be universally accepted: e.g. H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law 
(11th edn., O.U.P. 2014) 289; R. Jennings & A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law 
(Longman 1992) 58–59; G. Marston, “Unincorporated Treaties and Colonial Law” (1990) 20 Hong 
Kong Law Journal 178; F. Vallat, International Law and the Practitioner (Manchester University 
Press 1966) 7–8; W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law Vol XIV (Methuen & Co. 1964) 73; 
W.R. Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution Vol. II (O.U.P. 1911) 109–10. 
16 See e.g. Lord McNair, “The Debt of International Law in Britain to The Civil Law and the 
Civilians” (1953) 39 Transactions of the Grotius Society 183, 198. Phillimore’s Commentaries 
upon International Law (Butterworths, 1854–61) ran to three editions. 
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were overturned on appeal,17 in a judgment where the Court of Appeal expressed 
no opinion upon Sir Robert Phillimore’s judgment on the treaty point. As Lord 
McNair put it in 1928, the judgment at first instance “has since been regarded as 
the authoritative statement” of the relationship between international treaties and 
English law. 18  Thus the Privy Council observed in John Junior Higgs that 
“unincorporated treaties cannot change the law of the land”; “[t]hey have no effect 
upon the rights and duties of citizens in common or statute law: see the classic 
judgment of Sir Robert Phillimore in The Parlement Belge”.19 
This article will seek to demonstrate that the broad assertion advanced in 
Tin Council, and restated in Miller, is too bald to give a convincing representation 
of the correct position. The Parlement Belge and contemporary (as well as both 
earlier and later) constitutional and judicial authorities recognize that there are in 
fact situations in which the courts may give effect to obligations contained in 
unincorporated treaties. As will also be shown, these authorities are more than just 
a Tennysonian “wilderness of single instances”:20 they follow a pattern which is 
based on a discernible and attractive rule. But the aim of this article is not to turn 
on its head the main tenets of English constitutional law governing the treaty 
making power of the Crown:21 it is rather to look more closely at what happens in 
the penumbras and emanations of these foundational rules of the English 
constitution. Four preliminary points should be made in that regard. 
First, this article is not concerned with the rule of statutory construction 
that ambiguous provisions will be construed so as not to place the United 
Kingdom in breach of its international obligations, as set out in Lyons 22  and 
Assange.23 
Secondly, the article does not deal with the generally recognized 
proposition that prerogative powers can be exercised to change the facts to which 
                                                             
17 (1880) P.D. 197. 
18 Lord McNair, “When Do British Treaties Involve Legislation?” (1928) 9 B.Y.I.L. 59, 60–61. 
Also: E.C.S. Wade, “Act of State in English Law: Its Relations with International Law” (1934) 15 
B.Y.I.L. 98, 98; G. Marston, “Unincorporated Treaties and Colonial Law” (1990) 20 Hong Kong 
Law Journal 178, 178–80; P. Sales & J. Clement, “International Law in Domestic Courts: The 
Developing Framework” (2008) 124 L.Q.R. 388, 395 n.27. 
19  John Junior Higgs v Minister of National Security [2000] 2 A.C. 228 (P.C.), 241 (Lord 
Hoffmann). 
20 Alfred, Lord Tennyson, “Aylmer’s Field” (1793). 
21 cf. B. Malkani, “Human Rights Treaties in the English Legal System” [2011] P.L. 554. 
22 R. v Lyons [2002] UKHL; [2003] 1 A.C. 976 at [27] (Lord Hoffmann). 
23 Assange v The Swedish Prosecutor [2012] UKSC 22; [2012] 2 A.C. 471 at [122] (Lord Dyson). 
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the law applies, so that the exercise of the prerogative to declare war will have 
certain legal consequences, e.g. that certain individuals become enemy aliens, or 
the prerogative to extend UK territorial waters may have certain legal 
consequences, e.g. the criminalization of broadcasts from ships in the extended 
area, where broadcasts had previously been lawful. As the Supreme Court 
observed in Miller, in such cases “the exercise has not created or changed the law, 
merely the extent of its application”.24  
Thirdly, this essay does not make claims about whole categories of treaty, 
such as human rights treaties or peace treaties. It cannot legitimately be said that 
whole categories of treaty can generally be held to be part of English law without 
incorporation. This is, in part, because treaties contain many different types of 
provision. For example, the more than 400 articles of the Treaty of Versailles of 
191925  regulated matters as variegated as constitutive charters of international 
organizations, questions of territorial status, minority rights as well as several 
other types of issue.26 Similarly, a human rights treaty is likely to contain a wide 
variety provisions from, in the case of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,27 
substantive provisions such as art.3 on the best interests of the child to the rather 
different art.43 on the establishment of a Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
Rather, the approach must be, as the Supreme Court has said in different but 
related connection, a “much more fine-grained approach—disaggregating the 
general category in order to achieve the specialization of the principle in its 
application to particular classes of case”.28 Indeed, such a disaggregated approach 
is often taken when treaties are incorporated through legislation. Thus the United 
Nations Act 194629 incorporated only the part of the UN Charter that was felt to be 
suitable for incorporation—i.e. art.41.30  
                                                             
24 Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 
583 at [53]. 
25 June 28, 1919, 225 C.T.S. 189. 
26 P. Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties (Paul Kegan International 1995) 25–30; E. Bjorge, 
The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (O.U.P. 2014) 34–35. 
27 November 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
28 Belhaj v Straw and Others and Rahmatullah (No. 1) v Ministry of Defence and Another [2017] 
UKSC 3; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 456 at [33] (Lord Mance), citing C. McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law 
(C.U.P. 2014) 524–25 (inverted commas removed). 
29 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c.45. 
30 Art.41 provides: “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of 
the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 
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Thirdly, owing to exigencies of space this article will not enter into a 
discussion of who exactly is a “subject” (and the extent to which “subject” and 
“citizen” are precisely overlapping categories). It will simply follow the House of 
Lords and Supreme Court in taking the broad view that, so far as constitutional 
rights are concerned, an individual resident in the United Kingdom is “a subject by 
local allegiance even with a subject’s rights and obligations”.31 
 
The orthodoxy as recently questioned 
Whilst the question of whether certain unincorporated treaty obligations can be a 
part of English law has not in recent times come squarely before the courts, it has 
gained topicality through certain recent judicial dicta. Thus Lord Kerr in J.S. held 
that the courts can rely on the whole category of unincorporated human rights 
treaties: “the time has come for the exception to the dualist theory”, according to 
which unincorporated treaties cannot have any incidence on domestic law, “in 
human rights conventions to be openly recognised”.32 As Lord Kerr explained, the 
Privy Council in Lewis had acknowledged the argument that an exception might 
be read into the traditional rules when the convention under advisement was a 
human rights convention.33 Lord Kerr also noted the doubt cast by Lord Steyn in 
McKerr on the applicability of the rules of non-justiciability so far as they 
governed the position in connection with human rights conventions. Lord Steyn 
had held that the rationale of the so-called dualist theory was that “any inroad on it 
would risk abuses by the executive to the detriment of citizens”, adding that it was 
“difficult to see what relevance this has to international human rights treaties 
which create fundamental rights for individuals against the state and its 
agencies”.34  Lord Steyn in McKerr concluded by observing that a critical re-
examination of this branch of the law may become necessary in the future.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communications, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” 
31 Rahmatullah (No. 2) v Ministry of Defence and Another & Mohammed and Others v Ministry of 
Defence and Another [2017] UKSC 1; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 287 at [5] (Lady Hale), citing Johnstone v 
Pedlar [1921] 2 A.C. 262, 276; (1921) 1 I.L.R. 231 (Viscount Cave). 
32 R. (J.S.) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16; [2015] 1 W.L.R. 1449 at 
[254] (Lord Kerr). 
33 Lewis v Attorney General of Jamaica [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C.), 84 (Lord Slynn). 
34 McKerr [2004] UKHL 12; [2004] 1 W.L.R. 807 at [52] (Lord Steyn). 
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Sales and Clement have delivered a sustained and powerful critique of 
Lord Steyn’s dictum.35  A particularly interesting point they make is that it is 
incorrect, as a matter of constitutional principle, to say that the underlying 
principle on which the general rule is based is to guard against “abuses by the 
executive to the detriment of citizens”.36 They argue that this is not the rationale 
for the general rule: 
 
The true rationale is that the Crown cannot change domestic law by the 
exercise of its powers under the prerogative, which is a rule reflecting 
and supporting the sovereignty of Parliament and its primacy as the 
domestic law-making institution in our constitution.37 
 
Against this background, it seems useful to re-examine the age-old authorities on 
which the competing formulations of the guiding principles are said to rest. Such a 
re-examination seems particularly topical as the Supreme Court has recently 
signalled that the “interesting question” of whether some unincorporated treaty 
obligations, such as art.3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, could be 
relied on by the courts should be examined by it in a proper case.38 
 
Historical antecedents 
As parsed above, the judgment by Sir Robert Phillimore in The Parlement Belge39 
is taken to be the source and origin of how English law views the question of 
whether an unincorporated treaty obligation is or is not domestically operative.40 
The judgment merits scrutiny. It concerned a collision at sea between a Belgian 
mail packet and the vessel of a British subject. The Crown had, based on the 
unincorporated Belgium–Great Britain Postal Convention, entered into in 1876,41 
purported to confer immunity on the Belgian vessel, thus effectively depriving the 
British subject of the right to bring proceedings against the vessel for damage 
sustained in the collision. Sir Robert Phillimore determined in the judgment that 
                                                             
35 P. Sales & J. Clement, “International Law in Domestic Courts: The Developing Framework” 
(2008) 124 L.Q.R. 388, 398–400. 
36 McKerr [2004] UKHL 12; [2004] 1 W.L.R. 807 at [50] (Lord Steyn). 
37 P. Sales & J. Clement, “International Law in Domestic Courts: The Developing Framework” 
(2008) 124 L.Q.R. 388, 399. 
38 Nzolameso v City of Westminster [2015] UKSC 22; [2015] W.L.R. 165 at [29] (Lady Hale). 
39 The Parlement Belge (1879) 4 P.D. 129. 
40 e.g. John Junior Higgs v Minister of National Security [2000] 2 A.C. 228 (P.C.), 241 (Lord 
Hoffmann). 
41 February 17, 1876, 160 C.T.S. 99. 
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there could in principle exist treaties which operated domestically without the 
confirmation of the legislature. There was “a class of treaties the provisions of 
which were inoperative without the confirmation of the legislature; while there 
were others which operated without such confirmation”. 42  Pausing there, that 
statement is noteworthy in so far as it plainly goes against the grain of the idea that 
no unincorporated treaty obligation can be part of English law. Phillimore went on 
to observe that one example in this regard was: 
 
the Declaration of Paris in 1856, by which the Crown in the exercise of 
its prerogative deprived this country of belligerent rights, which very 
high authorities in the state and in the law had considered to be of vital 
importance to it. But this declaration did not affect the private rights of 
the subject; and the question before me is whether this treaty does affect 
private rights, and therefore required the sanction of the legislature. … 
If the Crown had power without the authority of parliament by this 
treaty to order that the Parlement Belge should be entitled to all the 
privileges of a ship of war, then the warrant, which is prayed for against 
her as wrong-doer on account of the collision, cannot issue, and the 
right of the subject, but for this order unquestionable, to recover 
damages for the injuries done to him by her is extinguished.43 
 
The test for whether the court could base its judgment on the treaty provisions at 
issue was not whether the treaty had been incorporated or not: it was whether the 
treaty affected or extinguished the private rights of the subject. Given that the 
British–Belgian postal treaty in The Parlement Belge would deprive the British 
subject of his rights, by taking away his right to sue the Belgian mail packet 
following the collision, the treaty must be inoperative without the confirmation of 
the legislature. According to The Parlement Belge, then, the pertinent question is 
not simply whether the treaty had been incorporated or not; it was “whether this 
treaty does affect private rights, and therefore required the sanction of the 
legislature”.44 
Several examples could be given which combine to bear out that that was in 
principle the correct test to be applied—four will be given here. These instances 
go back as far as to the first year of the new constitutional dispensation ushered in 
                                                             
42 The Parlement Belge (1879) 4 P.D. 129, 150 (emphasis added). 
43 The Parlement Belge (1879) 4 P.D. 129, 150 (emphasis added). 
44 The Parlement Belge (1879) 4 P.D. 129, 150. 
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by the Glorious Revolution and continue up to and beyond the period when The 
Parlement Belge was decided. As will be shown, when cases emerged, in the 
period after The Parlement Belge, where that test was put to the test, the judges 
were prepared to give individuals rights on the basis of unincorporated treaty 
provisions. 
A word should be said about the nature of certain of these examples, as some 
of them are court judgments; others, examples of constitutional practice or advice 
rendered to the government by senior Law Officers of the Crown, such as the 
Attorney General and the Solicitor General. In Rahmatullah (No. 2) it was plainly 
accepted that one such opinion, by Sir William Murray from 1753,45 advising the 
Crown that a belligerent power was entitled in international law to seize not only 
enemy property but the property of neutrals destined for an enemy, enjoyed high 
authority.46 Nissan the House of Lords relied on opinions of the Law Officers as a 
source of municipal law, particular reliance being placed on advice47 given in 1728 
by, “eminent counsel who ultimately became Lord Hardwicke and Lord Talbot”,48 
that is, Attorney General Sir Philip Yorke and Solicitor General Sir Charles 
Talbot, relating to the seizure of British ships in British Plantations. 49  More 
generally, it is not at all unusual for the courts to take account of constitutional 
practice or tradition in the ascertainment of the rules of the English constitution.50 
 First, the analysis of The Parlement Belge set out above finds support in an 
opinion by, amongst others, the Chief Justices of the King’s Bench (Sir John Holt) 
and Common Pleas (Sir Henry Pollexfen), and the Judge of the High Court of 
Admiralty (Sir Charles Hedges), in response to a question regarding English goods 
in foreign prize referred to it by the Crown in 1689,51 hot on the heels of the 
Glorious Revolution. The title of the report was Opinion of the judges as to the 
power of the crown to affect by treaty the right of English subjects to arrest and 
                                                             
45 (1836) 20 B.F.S.P. 889.  
46 Rahmatullah (No. 2) v Ministry of Defence and Another & Mohammed and Others v Ministry of 
Defence and Another [2017] UKSC 1; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 287 at [59] (Lord Mance), [82] (Lord 
Sumption). 
47 G. Chalmers (ed), Opinions of Eminent Lawyers Vol. II (C. Goodrich & Co. 1858) 339. 
48 Attorney General v Nissan [1970] A.C. 179, 209 (Lord Reid). 
49 Attorney General v Nissan [1970] A.C. 179, 209 (Lord Reid); 234 (Lord Wilberforce). 
50 See e.g. Nairn v University of St Andrews [1909] A.C. 147, 162–63 (Lord Ashbourne); R. v 
Halliday [1917] A.C. 260, 300–305 (Lord Shaw); Hanratty v Lord Butler (1971) 115 S.J. 386; Sir 
Philip Sales, “Rights and Fundamental Rights in English Law” (2016) 75 C.L.J. 86, 97. 
51 R.G. Marsden (ed.), Documents relating to Law and Custom of the Sea Vol. II (Navy Records 
Society 1916) 124. 
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claim their goods in prizes brought to England by a foreign captor, and it held that 
it was: 
 
not consistent with the laws of England to make it an article of treaty 
with another Kingdome or state that in case prizes be taken by the 
privateers of the one Kingdome or state, and brought into the ports of the 
other, they shall in all cases be judged by the respective Admiraltys of 
that Kingdom or state to which the privateers belong, and shall be 
permitted to go thether from out of those ports for that purpose. For if 
any ship or goods be taken by a forreign privateer, and brought into any 
port of this kingdome, and such ship or goods shall be here claimed by 
your Majesty’s subjects as belonging to them, they have a right by law to 
have a warrant out of your Majesty’s court of Admiralty to arrest the 
same, in order to try their claimes; and no article in any treaty can 
exclude them from such their right.52  
 
By way of background, in authorities predating the Glorious Revolution, it had 
been held that an unincorporated treaty could indeed apply as the law of the land 
even though it detrimentally altered the rights of English subjects.53 After 1688 
that was no longer possible, and the 1689 opinion of the Chief Justices is early and 
clear proof that English constitutional law, after the Glorious Revolution, did not 
accept as operative unincorporated treaties which deprived the subject of existing 
legal rights. But this authority falls short of proving the negative, in the sense that 
it does not show that, had the treaty provisions not excluded the individuals in 
question from their right but instead strengthened their rights or created new rights 
for them, then the treaty obligations would have been operative. For that, the 
second exemplar, it is necessary to spool a few decades forward, to the opinion 
that the House of Lords treated as a source of domestic law in Nissan.  
In 1728 Attorney General Sir Philip Yorke and Solicitor General Sir Charles 
Talbot54 had been asked to advise on the legality of a provision in his majesty’s 
general instructions to his several governors in America, which contained a 
                                                             
52 R.G. Marsden (ed.), Documents relating to Law and Custom of the Sea Vol. II (Navy Records 
Society 1916) 125–26 (original spelling kept; emphases added). 
53 See e.g. the 1665 judgment by Sir Leoline Jenkins, sitting in the Admiralty Court, determining 
that certain goods of Englishmen ought to be restored to their English owners, but only “if the 
league between England and Portugal did not hinder” such restoral: R.G. Marsden (ed), Documents 
relating to Law and Custom of the Sea Vol II (Navy Records Society 1916) 59–61 & W. Wynne, 
Life of Leoline Jenkins Vol. II (1724) 732–33. 
54 G. Chalmers (ed), Opinions of Eminent Lawyers Vol. II (C. Goodrich & Co. 1858) 339. 
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reference to arts.5 and 6 of the unincorporated Anglo–French Treaty of Peace for a 
Neutrality in America,55 according to which: 
the subjects, inhabitants, &c. of each kingdom are prohibited to trade and 
fish, in all places possessed, or which shall be possessed, by them, or 
either of them, in America; and that if any ships shall be found trading 
contrary to the said treaty, upon due proof, the said ships shall be 
confiscated; but in case the subjects of either king shall be forced, by 
stress or weather, enemies, or other necessity, into the ports of the other, 
in America, they shall be treated with humanity and kindness, and may 
provide themselves with victuals, and other things necessary for their 
sustenance, and reparation of their ships, at reasonable rates, provided 
they do not break bulk, nor carry any goods out of their ships, exposing 
them to sale, nor receive any merchandize on board, under penalty of 
confiscation of ship and goods. 
 
In spite of the injunctions of the treaty—“provided they do not … carry any goods 
out of their ships, exposing them to sale”—trade had been carried on between the 
British and French settlements in America, “on pretence that there is no law in 
force against such trade”.56 In the view of Yorke and Talbot this pretence was 
incorrect: their advice to the commissioners for trade and plantations was that: 
 
you signify to our subjects, under your government, the purport and 
intent of the abovesaid two articles, and that you take particular care 
that the same be punctually observed and put in execution, and that no 
illegal trade be carried on 
 
between the British and French subjects in the settlements.57 In other words, Yorke 
and Talbot took arts.5 and 6 to have overridden the law of the land in the colonies 
in question. But they went on to say that it was not the intent of the treaty to 
provide that either Britain or France “should seize and confiscate the ships or 
goods of their own subjects, for contravening the said articles”.58 Had that been the 
case, such an intention “could not have had its effect with respect to his majesty’s 
subjects, unless the said articles had been confirmed either by the act of Parliament 
of Great Britain, or by acts of assembly, within the respective plantations”.59 That 
is significant. What Yorke and Talbot’s opinion shows is that, whereas the 
                                                             
55 November 16, 1686, 18 C.T.S. 83. 
56 G. Chalmers (ed.), Opinions of Eminent Lawyers Vol. II (C. Goodrich & Co. 1858) 340. 
57 G. Chalmers (ed.), Opinions of Eminent Lawyers Vol. II (C. Goodrich & Co. 1858) 340–41. 
58 G. Chalmers (ed.), Opinions of Eminent Lawyers Vol. II (C. Goodrich & Co. 1858) 342. 
59 G. Chalmers (ed.), Opinions of Eminent Lawyers Vol. II (C. Goodrich & Co. 1858) 342. 
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provisions which were thought not to affect the rights of his majesty’s subjects 
were held to be operative without incorporation, those concerning seizure and 
confiscation of the ships and goods of British subjects could not be operative. The 
latter—and only the latter—would have required legislation.  
Thirdly, in connection with collisions between English and foreign ships in 
the 1860–80s there is ample constitutional practice bearing out the reading made 
above of Phillimore’s judgment in The Parlement Belge.60 In respect of a collision 
in the English Channel of the Jersey vessel Antagonist and the Belgian mail packet 
Rubis, the owners of the former obtained a warrant from the Admiralty Court to 
arrest the latter. Belgium, through its Minister in London, observed that the vessel 
enjoyed immunity by reason of the 1844 Anglo–Belgian Postal Convention.62 On 
April 12, 1861 the Foreign Office was advised by the Attorney General, Sir 
Richard Bethell, that: 
 
The words of the Treaty are so large that they must have been understood 
as containing an engagement that a vessel “freighted” that is, taken up, by 
the Belgian Government for the postal service should be free from every 
Civil process when in an English harbour. But unless there is an Act of 
Parliament expressly authorizing this Government to enter into such a 
stipulation, it would have no effect on the rights of individuals.63  
 
Furthermore, in a letter to the Spanish Minister in London of 20 July 1887 (and in 
similar letters to the Belgian,64 German,65 and Italian66 representatives in London 
from the same period) the Foreign Secretary, the Marquess of Salisbury, made 
reference to the judgment of Sir Robert Phillimore in The Parlement Belge and 
went on to say: 
 
The Courts held that it was not competent to the Crown, without the 
authority of Parliament, to clothe these subsidized vessels with the 
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62 1844, 19 C.T.S. 345. 
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immunities of foreign ships of war, so as to deprive British subjects of their 
right to proceed against them for the enforcement of their legal rights.67 
 
Fourthly, the reading made above of The Parlement Belge is reinforced by the 
language adopted by the Judicial Board of the Privy Council in Walker v Baird.68 
There a lobster factory on the coast of Newfoundland was shut down by a 
government officer charged with the enforcement of a British–French treaty 
regulating lobster fisheries,69 and the owner brought an action against the Crown. 
The Attorney General assumed in argument that the mere allegation that the acts 
were done in pursuance of a treaty took the matter out of the cognizance of the 
court. He argued that, as the Crown had unfettered powers to enter into a treaty 
designed to put an end to or prevent war, there was incidental to that power also a 
right on the part of the Crown to make any orders and carry out any acts necessary 
to implement such a treaty, even if the acts would encroach on the legal rights of 
private persons. Lord Herschell L.C., delivering judgment, did not share this view.  
He observed that the Crown could not sanction an invasion by its officers of the 
rights of private individuals whenever it was necessary in order to compel 
obedience to the terms of the treaty; this was a question of whether “interference 
with private rights can be authorized otherwise than by the Legislature”.70 Walker 
v Baird seems therefore to be valuable Privy Council authority for the proposition 
that the real question that needs asking in connection with an unincorporated treaty 
obligation is whether or not it interferes with private rights. As Lord Reid held in 
Nissan: 
 
It is sometimes said, or at least suggested, that an act of the executive 
obtains some additional protection if it is done in execution or furtherance 
of some treaty. I do not see why that should be so. … There is no doubt 
that it is within the prerogative right of the Crown to make treaties and no 
subject, whether within or outside the realm, can object on the ground that 
the making of the treaty has caused him loss. … But it would be quite 
another matter if the Crown infringed his ordinary legal rights and 
                                                             
67 Foreign Office Confidential Print No. 5475 (F.O. 881/1123) 22 (emphasis added). 
68 Walker v Baird [1892] A.C. 491 (P.C.), 496–97 (Lord Herschell L.C.). 
69 It is not clear from the judgment exactly what was the treaty in question. 
70 Walker v Baird [1892] A.C. 491 (P.C.), 497. 
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founded on its obligations under a treaty as a defence. That was made 
clear by the decision in Walker v Baird.71 
 
Similarly, Lawton L.J. in Laker Airways observed in connection with the treaty 
making powers of the Crown that: “the Secretary of State cannot use the Crown’s 
powers in this sphere in such a way as to take away the rights of citizens: see 
Walker v Baird”.72 
It can be concluded that whether an unincorporated treaty could operate in 
domestic law depended on whether it deprived the citizen of existing legal rights 
or interfered with those rights. The protection of the rights of the citizen seems to 
have been at the heart of the rule applied in the constitutional practice referred 
from the period from the 1680s up until the 1880s, in The Parlement Belge and up 
until Walker v Baird. It was only later, however, that the test set out in The 
Parlement Belge and the other authorities analysed above was actually put to the 
test in court cases that showed that the judges were actually prepared to treat 
certain unincorporated treaty obligations as being a part of the law of the land.  
 
 
The test put to the test: 
Porter v Freudenberg and Imperial Japanese 
In particular, two judicial authorities—one decided by a full Court of Appeal, the 
other by the Judicial Board of the Privy Council—have led to a measure of 
confusion on account of the fact that both courts were prepared to give effect to 
unincorporated treaties. In both cases was the court prepared to rely on an 
unincorporated treaty provision with a view either to improving the position of the 
subject as against the state, or as between private parties. 
Porter v Freudenberg,85 decided by a unanimous Court of Appeal sitting as 
seven judges, concerned various individuals who during the First World War had 
connections with Germany. The court was prepared to rely on the unincorporated 
art.23(h) of the Hague Convention of 1907 which, it was argued in the case, would 
give a person voluntarily resident or carrying on business in Germany in wartime 
                                                             
71 Attorney General v Nissan [1970] A.C. 179, 211 (Lord Reid) (emphasis added).  
72 Laker Airways Ltd. v Department of Trade [1977] Q.B. 643, 728 (Lawton L.J.). 
85 Porter v Freudenberg [1915] 1 KB 857. 
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and who, even if British, would thus be an “enemy alien” in the so-called 
territorial sense of the term, the right to sue in the British courts in time of war. 
The court explained that “[f]or the purpose of determining civil rights a British 
subject or the subject of a neutral State, who is voluntarily resident or who is 
carrying on business in hostile territory, is to be regarded and treated as an alien 
enemy and is in the same position as a subject of hostile nationality resident in 
hostile territory.”86 According to the common law such a person could not sue in 
the King’s courts.  
The ratified but unincorporated art.23(h) made it unlawful “[t]o declare 
abolished, suspended or inadmissible the right of the subjects of the hostile party 
to institute legal proceedings”. The Court of Appeal found that the intention of the 
provision was not to regulate the question at issue in the case before it but rather to 
forbid declarations by a military commander of a belligerent force in the 
occupation of the enemy’s territory which would prevent the inhabitants of that 
territory from using their courts of law in order to protect their civil rights. The 
question was: 
whether the operation of this paragraph is or is not to abrogate the old rule 
[…] that an enemy alien’s rights of action are suspended during war, jurists 
of eminence have expressed widely divergent views upon the point, and 
this Court has given to those views its very careful consideration. We are 
all clearly of the opinion that the paragraph in question cannot be treated as 
effecting any such abrogation.87 
The Court of Appeal concluded that “the paragraph has not the extended meaning 
claimed for it and does not affect the ancient rule of the English common law that 
an alien enemy, unless with special licence or authorization of the Crown, has no 
right to sue in our Courts during the war”.88 As will have become clear, the reason 
the case is of interest in the present connection was that the matter had been 
argued on the assumption that the unincorporated art. 23(h) bound the court; even 
the intervening Attorney General had taken that view. If, therefore, the court had 
pronounced in favour of the meaning contended for, alien enemies in the territorial 
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sense would have been allowed to sue in the King’s courts in time of war, and, as 
it was put by, Lord McNair, “an ancient rule of the common law would have been 
abrogated by a prerogatival act without any statutory sanction”.89 This led McNair 
to take the view that the judgment could not easily be explained away, adding that 
it was a case which, ‘it must be confessed, causes some heart-searching’.90 
F.A. Mann agreed with McNair’s characterization,91 and for his own part 
referred to “the puzzling features of the great case of Porter v Freudenberg”.92 
Against that background Mann went on to ask, “How could Art. 23(h) override the 
common law in the absence of incorporation into English law?” His answer was 
that the provision became material only because regulations concerning the 
conduct of war come within the purview of the prerogative and can therefore 
change English law.93 
Yet another commentator, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, took the view of the 
judgment that “it apparently assumed that Article 23(h) of Hague Convention no. 
IV respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land was enforceable by British 
courts although that Convention had never received express legislative assent”,94 
adding that the case could be understood only as a function of whether “the private 
rights of the subject” had been affected.95 As will become clear below, this article 
seeks to show that that view is the correct one: but first it is necessary to consider 
the second exemplar that has foxed the literature. 
Imperial Japanese Government v P. & O. Steam Navigation Company,97 
sometimes referred to as the case of the Ravenna and the Chishima,98 concerned 
the unincorporated British–Japanese Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and 
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Commerce,99 which gave British subjects rights to preferential treatment, through 
a so-called “most favoured nation” clause, that is, a treaty provision that operates 
to ensure that the relevant parties treat each other in a manner at least as 
favourable as they treat third parties.100 In 1892 the Ravenna, a British merchant 
vessel, collided with the Japanese imperial cruiser the Chishima. A number of 
proceedings were instituted. In one of them the Japanese government had sued in 
the British consular court for damages before R.A. Mowat, Judge in the British 
Court for Japan, from which the case was appealed to the Supreme Court for 
China and Japan at Shanghai, it too a consular court, and then to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. One of the central questions was whether, 
contrary to the argument put by counsel for the Imperial Japanese Government, a 
British subject had a right to require that when a Japanese claimant had a 
complaint or grievance against him the case should be decided not by the local 
courts of Japan, but by British curial authorities exercising extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. The respondent claimed to have this right on the basis of the 
unincorporated treaty and certain other treaties against the background of which 
the treaty was to be interpreted. 
Thus the Privy Council was seized of the question of whether, by reason of 
the unincorporated British–Japanese treaty, British subjects enjoyed all the 
privileges and immunities secured to the United States and Austro-Hungary under 
a similar US–Japanese treaty102 and Austro-Hungarian–Japanese treaty, 103 both of 
which were also, self-evidently, unincorporated as a matter of English law. The 
applicable law was English law: the case was an appeal from a consular court, 
whose jurisdiction was, according to the Order in Council setting it up, to “be 
exercised upon the principles of and in conformity with the Common Law, the 
rules of Equity, the Statute Law and other Law for the time being in force in and 
for England”.105 
The Privy Council determined that, owing to the most favoured nation 
clause in the British–Japanese Treaty, all the privileges enjoyed by US American 
                                                             
99 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Commerce, 1858, 119 C.T.S. 401. 
100 See R. Dolzer & C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn., O.U.P. 
2012) 206. 
102 1858, 119 C.T.S. 253. 
103 1859, 140 C.T.S. 53. 
105 Art.5, Order in Council for the Exercise of Jurisdiction in China and Japan, March 9, 1865, 
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and Austro-Hungarian subjects were also enjoyed by British subjects. It concluded 
that it was: 
 
clear that art. 23 of the treaty of August, 1858, which accorded to Great 
Britain “most favoured nation” treatment, conferred upon this country 
and its subjects all the privileges and immunities secured to the United 
States and Austro-Hungary and their respective subjects, by the treaties 
to which reference has been made. There cannot, therefore, be any 
doubt that a British subject has a right to require that when a Japanese 
has a complaint or grievance against him, it shall be decided, not by the 
Local Courts of Japan, but by the British authorities exercising in that 
country extraterritorial jurisdiction.106 
 
The basis was the treaty: “The defendant has obtained, by virtue of a treaty made 
with his Sovereign, complete immunity from process in the territorial Courts 
which would otherwise be open to the plaintiff.”107 The treaty was not applied by a 
side-wind: “Their Lordships have dwelt at length upon the effect of the treaty 
provisions, because they regard these as determining the question in controversy 
between the parties.”108 One contemporary commentator, Sir Francis Piggott, took 
the view that the effect of the ruling was “to establish the paramount importance of 
recognising the terms of the treaty”. 109  The case seems to constitute a clear 
example of an unincorporated treaty being operative before the courts, and it is 
submitted that the only reason this was the case was that the treaty did not infringe 
the existing legal rights of the citizen but rather added to them. 
Two modern commentators, F.A. Mann and Geoffrey Marston, both 
considered the judgment to be puzzling on account of the fact that the Privy 
Council relied on a treaty that plainly had not been incorporated.110 
In Mann’s view it was likely that, in exercising jurisdiction in foreign 
territories, the Crown was free from the shackles imposed by English 
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constitutional law. On his reading, s.3 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890111 in 
fact provided just that.112 It is, however, difficult to accede to this theory: and for 
two connected reasons. 
First, the judgment explicitly refers to the China and Japan Order in 
Council of 1865 which established the court, and, as mentioned above, that 
instrument directed that English law was the applicable law. Secondly, s.3 of the 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890 did not concern the question of the applicable law. 
It provided that: “Every Act and thing done in pursuance of any jurisdiction of Her 
Majesty in a foreign country shall be valid as if it had been done according to the 
law then in force in that country”. The very wording makes it clear that the 
provision concerned the validity of acts done in pursuance of jurisdiction. The 
side-note to s.3, “Validity of acts done in pursuance of jurisdiction”, points away 
from a conclusion that s.3 was meant to concern anything other than the validity of 
what had been done in pursuance of jurisdiction. The provision says nothing 
whatever of what was to be the applicable law of the court but, for present 
purposes, that a judgment, once rendered, was to be valid as if it were a judgment 
done according to local law. 
Marston’s analysis begins from the premise that, although the Crown had 
power under the prerogative to conclude treaties, a treaty could not directly change 
the law to be applied to British subjects even in foreign countries.118 In his view 
the answer to why the Privy Council could nevertheless have relied on the treaty 
provisions may lie in the extraterritorial regime itself, which was thought by the 
opposing sides in the case either to depend on concessions made by the Emperor 
of Japan or to be a system imposed on Japan by force.119 This led Marston to 
conclude that “[a]lthough the Judicial Committee did not refer directly to the 
above controversy, the terms of the ruling indicate that the treaty regime was 
regarded as paramount”, 120 adding that in the subsequent case of Charlesworth, 
Pilling & Co. the Privy Council had, in relation to consular courts at Zanzibar, 
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determined that “[t]he root of the jurisdiction is the treaty grant or other matter by 
which the Queen has power and jurisdiction in Zanzibar”.121 This focus on the 
treaty regime, and the rights flowing from it, must be correct. 
The judgment seems to be an example of a situation where a court, relying 
on English law, gave effect to an unincorporated treaty in a situation where British 
subjects were accorded rights directly by reason of the treaty regime in question, 
none of their already existing rights being infringed by the operation of that 
regime. Although it may have been underpinned in reality by an imperial impetus, 
rather than consideration for the fundamental rights of the subject, the judgment 
seems to be suffused with a wish to strengthen the position and the rights of the 
British subject, though admittedly at the expense of a foreign government, and to 
do so on the basis of unincorporated treaty rights. It may also be that, in treating 
the unincorporated treaty provisions as being operative, the Privy Council took 
heart from the fact that the treaty concerned commerce, which, although it is now 
largely forgotten, was at least historically an activity falling under the 
prerogative.122 
At all events, the fact that it was the treaty itself that immunized British 
subjects from suit in the local courts seems to be clear from the language adopted 
in the judgment: “[b]ut for the treaty, they would be liable to process in the Courts 
of Japan”. 123  Sir Francis Piggott concluded in his contemporary work 
Extraterritoriality: the Law Relating to Consular Jurisdiction and to Residence in 
Oriental Countries that it was apparent from the judgment that the case of actions 
by or against natives in the British Courts “rest[ed] entirely on the treaty”.124 The 
Privy Council spoke in terms of the “right” a British subject had “to require that 
when a Japanese has a complaint or grievance against him it shall be decided, not 
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by the local Courts of Japan, but by the British authorities”;125 the outcome must 
not be inconsistent with the “treaty rights” at issue.126  
The Parlement Belge concerned a case where the respondent could not be 
said to have immunity from suit, as the unincorporated treaty which was claimed 
to clothe it with immunity could not be allowed to affect the private rights of the 
subject, the British claimant. Porter v Freudenberg and Imperial Japanese are 
particularly pertinent because the individual whose rights were at issue in those 
two cases claimed positively to have certain rights on the basis of a treaty: the 
individual did not, as in The Parlement Belge, claim that a treaty could not operate 
as it interfered with that individual’s rights. In Porter v Freudenberg the Court of 
Appeal was quite prepared to rely on unincorporated treaty rights enuring to a 
person residing or carrying on business in enemy territory so as potentially to 
override the common law by giving him or her rights to sue in the King’s courts in 
wartime: but, although the court was clear that the treaty operated in principle, it 
found that the right did not go as far as the respondent had argued. In Imperial 
Japanese the individual whose rights were at issue was again the respondent and, 
since the unincorporated treaty operated only to strengthen his rights, by making 
him immune from suit by the Imperial Japanese Government in the territorial 
courts of Japan, the Privy Council was prepared to give effect directly to the 
unincorporated treaty rights in issue. 
 
The separation of powers 
Tin Council was handed down in 1989, three centuries after the beginnings of a 
new constitutional order was heralded in 1689. The principle on which the case is 
taken to be authority is one which has a long back-story. We should, putting the 
point at its lowest, be open to the possibility that the hinterland of constitutional 
authority which lies between 1689 and 1989 can complement our understanding of 
the treaty making power of the Crown and whether unincorporated treaty 
obligations can in some cases be operative domestically. Academic argument 
must, as Craig recently observed in the context of historical perspectives on 
questions of public law, be grounded in some knowledge of what came before the 
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here and now: “[i]nsofar as this knowledge is exiguous it thereby diminishes the 
value of academic judgement”.127 
In that regard the discussion has shown that authorities such as the 1728 
Opinion of Attorney General Sir Philip Yorke and Solicitor General Sir Charles 
Talbot held that an unincorporated treaty could regulate certain aspects of life in 
British settlements in America. Crucially, however, it could not direct the seizure 
and confiscation of the property of British subjects, as that, and only that, would 
necessitate legislation incorporating the treaty obligations.129  The judgments in 
The Parlement Belge, Walker v Baird, Porter v Freudenberg, and Imperial 
Japanese are high judicial authorities for the proposition that an unincorporated 
treaty can be operative so long as it does not deprive British citizens of rights 
which they would otherwise have had. 
Dicey—perhaps the foremost authority on the “sovereignty of Parliament 
and its primacy as the domestic law-making institution in our constitution”130—
understood this. He was alive to the importance of judgments such as The 
Parlement Belge and Walker v Baird, to which he explicitly referred in his Law of 
the Constitution, observing that it was “open to question whether the treaty-
making power of the executive might not in some cases override the law of the 
land”. 131  It is significant that perhaps the strongest and most authoritative 
proponent of Parliamentary sovereignty should have taken this position. 
More generally the thrust of the authorities makes it possible to question 
statements such as Sales and Clement’s averment that the true rationale for the rule 
governing the operation in domestic law of unincorporated treaties “is that the 
Crown cannot change domestic law by the exercise of its powers under the 
prerogative”.132 The authorities are instead on all fours with what Lord Steyn held 
in McKerr, that is, that the underlying principle on which the general rule is based 
is to guard against “abuses by the executive to the detriment of citizens”.133  
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 A broader question of constitutional law arises, however. The question of 
whether a treaty can be part of English law unless and until it has been 
incorporated into the law by legislation has rightly been conceived of as having a 
bearing on what the Supreme Court in Moohan called “the fundamental separation 
of powers in our constitution”.134  
The principle of the separation of powers can no doubt be defined in 
different ways, and may be thought to be a difficult concept.135 Emanations of it is 
increasingly relied on directly by the courts, especially in what is becoming known 
as structural constitutional review, the demarcation of the respective ambit of 
legislative and executive power.136  If we try to operationalize it for the present 
purposes, it can be pointed out that there is strong authority to suggest that the 
principle has at its core the protection of individual liberty and individual rights. 
“If”, observed Sir William Holdsworth in his History of English Law, “a lawyer, a 
statesman, or a political philosopher of the eighteenth century had been asked what 
was, in his opinion, the most distinctive feature of the British constitution, he 
would have replied that its most distinctive feature was the separation of powers of 
the different organs of government”.137 Throughout the eighteenth century the fact 
that the powers of the state were divided between separate organs of government, 
which checked and balanced one another, “was regarded by men of all parties, by 
peers as well as commoners, and by statement as well as by publicists, as its most 
salient characteristic”.138The protection of the rights of the individual was at the 
core of the principle of separation of powers already in the eighteenth century. 
Blackstone in 1765 observed that fundamental rights were secured through the 
operation, first, of the “constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament”; 
secondly, of “[t]he limitation of the king’s prerogative by bounds so certain and 
notorious, that it is impossible he should exceed them without the consent of the 
people”; and, thirdly, [s]ince the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every 
man’s life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the 
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subject, and the law be duly administred therein”.139 Of the two first limbs, the 
power of Parliament and those of the Crown, he observed that: 
 
The former of these keeps the legislative power in due health and vigour, 
so as to make it improbable that laws should be enacted destructive of 
general liberty: the latter is a guard upon executive power, by restraining it 
from acting either beyond or in contradiction to the laws, that are framed 
and established by the other.140 
 
Blackstone said specifically of the Crown that “one of the principal bulwarks of 
civil liberty, or (in other words) of the British constitution, was the limitation of 
the king’s prerogative by bounds so certain and notorious that it is impossible he 
should ever exceed them”.141 Blackstone was not alone among prominent British 
commentators to form the view that the core of the principle of the separation of 
powers was the protection of individual liberty: Sir Philip Yorke,142 Paley,143 and 
Hume144 took the same view. Indeed, Holdsworth concluded that, in the view of 
the eighteenth century writers, the separation of powers was the “main guarantee 
for the preservation of liberty”, indeed the “most essential safeguard of 
constitutional liberty”.145  
As a matter of English constitutional law the courts are right to have 
stressed the principle of the separation of powers, as they began to do in the 
postwar period.146  In this connection the focus has, as Craig has pointed out, 
“shifted towards the direct protection of the individual”. 147  As Lord Mustill 
classically observed in ex p Fire Brigades Union, the application of the principle 
of the separation of powers operates to avoid a situation in which “the citizen 
would be left without protection against a misuse of executive powers”.148 The 
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principle, Lord Mance pointed out in Khoyratty, operates “as a primary protection 
of individual liberty”.149 That seems to accord with the approach taken by the 
authorities analysed in this essay.  
The courts have, in keeping with the core of the principle of the separation 
of powers, acted on the rule according to which the executive cannot override the 
common law if, to use the language of Lord Reid in Nissan,150 that change of the 
law infringed ordinary legal rights of citizens. It has been seen that unincorporated 
treaty obligations have been allowed in certain circumstances to override domestic 
law, as even Dicey countenanced.151 The constitutional long stop has been whether 
the treaty obligation at issue infringed the citizen’s existing legal rights. As the 
Privy Council expressed it recently in Thomas v Baptiste, the test is whether the 
treaty obligations would “deprive the subject of existing legal rights”.152 Had such 
a deprivation been in issue in the cases analysed above, the courts would no doubt 
have taken the view that the principle of the separation of powers was breached. 
The conclusion would, in that situation, have had to have been the same as in The 
Parlement Belge. There Sir Robert Phillimore concluded that the treaty obligations 
in question were such that they would extinguish existing legal rights of the 
citizen: for an English court to rely on them would then be “without precedent, and 
in principle contrary to the laws of the constitution”.153  
Nevertheless, it seems contrary to principle to hold that all provisions of 
ratified but unincorporated human rights treaties should ipso facto be a part of the 
law of the land. As the authorities analysed in this essay show, the approach taken 
by the courts is a disaggregated one. The question becomes not whether the treaty 
as such but the particular provisions at issue in the case before the court can be 
held to be operative. Any other approach would be extravagant: the courts can 
decide only on the operationability of the treaty provision before them, not on a 
treaty as a whole.  
It might be said, however, that such a solution falls far short of the clarity 
that is needed in this field: Lord Oliver’s approach is neat and tidy in that it says 
that no unincorporated treaty can ever be part of English law; the approach of Lord 
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Steyn and Lord Kerr, too, has the benefit of neatness and tidiness in that it says 
that all ratified human rights treaties are operative as the law of the land. But, as 
the historian Tony Judt once observed, it is the job of the historian—and much the 
same might go for the legal academic—to take “tidy nonsense and make a mess of 
it”; “[a]n accurate mess is far truer to life than elegant untruths”.155  
 Quite apart from that, like should be compared with like, and the position 
for which this essay argues is no more unclear than what is at present the case in 
connection with incorporated treaty obligations. As was said above, incorporating 
legislation such as the United Nations Act 1946, the long title of which is An Act 
to enable effect to be given to certain provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations,156 incorporated into English law only art.41 of the Charter. Similarly, the 
Bretton Woods Agreement Act 1945 157  gave effect only to certain particular 
provisions of the Bretton Woods Agreement. Although its long title was An Act to 
give effect to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, the Arbitration Act 1975158 incorporated only certain of 
the provisions of the New York Convention of 1958, omitting for example to 
incorporate the provisions dealing with recognition.159  Partial incorporation, in 
other words, is nothing new. 
The analogy does not stop there. Not only is it often the case that 
Parliament elects to incorporate only certain parts of a treaty: it happens from time 
to time that, owing to partial incorporation that is somehow ambiguous, the courts 
are unclear as to which parts of a treaty can be relied on. This is similar to the 
problem one might envisage in connection with the argument put forward in this 
article in respect of wholly unincorporated treaties.  
Lord Denning in Wilson Smithett interpreted the Bretton Woods 
Agreement Act 1945 to mean that the Act gave effect to all of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement;160 similarly F.A. Mann concluded that even “the very limited terms of 
the Act of 1945 are sufficient to incorporate the Articles of Agreement as a whole 
into English law”.161 Furthermore, in spite of the fact that, as seen above, the 
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United Nations Act 1946 incorporates only art.41, the courts have nevertheless 
relied on and given effect to other provisions of the UN Charter. In Kuwait 
Airways a critical feature of the House of Lords’ decision were a number of 
provisions of the UN Charter other than art.41. The submission by Iraqi Airways 
that, because these provisions were unincorporated, they must be disregarded was 
brusquely rejected as “marching logic to its ultimate unreality”.164 The solution 
offered in this article in respect of unincorporated treaties, therefore, is no more 
uncertain than the one with which we live in respect of incorporated treaties. 
It is worth remembering, too, that customary international law, defined in 
international law as “a general practice accepted as law”,165 is considered to be one 
of the sources of the common law—it can be relied on without any 
“incorporation”. 166  In Keyu the Supreme Court observed that customary 
international law: 
 
once established, can and should shape the common law, whenever it can 
do so consistently with domestic constitutional principles, statutory law 
and common law rules which the courts can themselves sensibly adapt 
without it being, for example, necessary to invite Parliamentary 
intervention or consideration.167 
 
Why not then, in certain circumstances, also treaty based international law? It 
might well be thought that customary international law and treaty based 
international law are in a similar position. As Lord Bingham recognized in Jones, 
customary international law “remains very much the consequence of international 
behaviour by the Executive, in which neither the Legislature nor the Courts, nor 
any other branch of the constitution, need have played any part”.168 It follows 
clearly from Jones, however, that a norm of customary international law cannot be 
relied on as a source of the common law when it detrimentally affects “the liberty 
of the individual and rights of personal property”, such as when it purports to 
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create new offences of criminal law (which only Parliament can do).169 There is no 
reason why customary international law norms to the benefit of the liberty of the 
individual and rights of personal property, created by the executive in cooperation 
with other states, should be able to be a source of the common law but that treaty 
based international law, created by the executive in cooperation with other states, 
should not in certain circumstances be able to play the same role. If the creation by 
the executive of norms of customary international law is allowed, as it is, to have 
domestic effect without that being thought to fall foul of Article 1 of the Bill of 
Rights, then why should the creation by the executive of treaty norms be any 
different? 
 
Conclusion  
The answer to the question of whether unincorporated treaty obligations can be a 
part of English law is Yes. The courts have allowed treaty rights to override the 
common law in certain situations where the rule in Tin Council would, were it 
entirely valid, not have allowed such an application. But this has been done only 
on the narrow grounds spelled out during the course of this essay. An attempt has 
been made to show that this state of affairs is attractive in that it coheres well with 
the core of the principle of the separation of powers, which operates as a primary 
protection of individual liberty. 170  It would be extravagant to say that whole 
categories of treaty are part of English law without incorporation simply because 
they are classified as, for example, human rights treaties. A disaggregated 
approach is what is called for. But, as it must be incorrect and extravagant to say 
that whole classes of treaty are operative because of the way in which they are 
classified, so it is also, in light of strong constitutional authority, incorrect and 
extravagant to say that, quite simply, a treaty is not part of English law unless and 
until it has been incorporated into the law by legislation. The question the courts 
should ask in each case is this—does the obligation effect a change of the law that 
infringes the existing legal rights of the subject? If it does not, then the court can 
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hold that the treaty right may, to use Dicey’s phrase, “override the law of the 
land”.172 
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